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The Law of Directed Trustees Under
ERISA: A Proposed Blueprint
for the Federal Courts
Colleen E. Medilr
The dynamic asset growth necessary to meet its responsibilities
has placed the private pension system in a position to influence
the level of savings, the operation of our capital markets, and the
relative financial security of millions of consumers, three of the
fundamental elements of our national economic security.'
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 2 the federal law governing private employer-sponsored employee
benefit plans,3 over twenty years ago. Since that time, private retirement plan
funds have become an even more dominant element of United States savings
and capital markets. In 1992, the most recent year for which data is available,

* Member of the Missouri Bar; J.D., University of Kansas, 1989.
1. Statement of the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor
regarding the need for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. H.R.
REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at various sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the
United States Code [hereinafter "ERISA"]). ERISA's original section numbers were
changed when it was codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, which contains
the federal labor provisions. Additionally, portions of ERISA were codified in the
Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code. References to ERISA in
this article will be to the 1994 edition of Title 29 and, where applicable, to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. Employee benefit plans subject to ERISA include both welfare benefit plans
and pension benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994). Welfare benefit plans
provide medical, sickness, disability, death, unemployment, or vacation benefits,
training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal expenses. See
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). Some types of welfare benefit plans, most notably those
providing medical benefits through a trust pursuant to section 501(c)(9) of the Internal
Revenue Code, hold plan assets in a trust. Pension benefit plans provide retirement
income to employees or result in a deferral of income by employees until the
termination of employment or beyond. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994). Types
of pension benefit plans for for-profit private employers include defined benefit plans,
profit sharing plans, cash or deferral arrangements (commonly known as "401(k)"
plans), money purchase pension plans, employee stock ownership plans, and executive
deferred compensation plans. ERISA requires that all pension benefit plans must hold
plan assets in a trust. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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private retirement plan assets exceeded two trillion dollars, almost a ten-fold
increase over 1975 asset levels
This enormous wealth of plan assets is generally required by ERISA to
be held in trust by one or more trustees.' Under ERISA there are two types
of trustees. "Discretionary" trustees have exclusive discretionary authority to
manage and control plan assets.' "Directed" trustees manage and control plan
assets subject to the directions of another fiduciary named in the document
governing the plan.7 Such directed trustees typically are the employer
sponsoring the plan or unrelated entities offering trustee services, such as
banks, trust companies, or affiliates of mutual fund companies or stock
brokerage companies.
One of the major issues Congress designed ERISA to address was
fiduciary responsibility for plan assets, particularly "the course of conduct in
fund transactions, the degree of responsibility required of the fiduciaries, the
types of persons who should be deemed pension 'fiduciaries,' and the
standards of accountability they shall be governed by in the management and
disposition of pension funds." 8 Unfortunately, achievement of these goals has
been clouded by recent federal court decisions regarding directed trustees. By
appearing to incorporate into ERISA principles developed under the common
law of trusts, these decisions may have the unintended effect of undermining
ERISA's carefully constructed statutory scheme of fiduciary responsibilities
and its protections for plan participants.9
This article analyzes the law of directed trustees under ERISA, a subject
that has received very little attention in scholarly literature.' Part I of the

4. See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, NO. 5 PRIVATE PENsION PLAN BULLETIN, ABSTRACT OF 1992 FORM 5500
ANNUAL REPORTS, Table Eli (Winter 1996). In 1975, total private pension plan

assets were $259,963,000,000. By 1992, total private pension plan assets were
$2,094,087,000,000.

These figures do not include funds held by life insurance

companies under insurance contracts for the payment of retirement benefits, which
would add an additional ten to fifteen percent to the above figures. See id.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994).
8. H. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4645.
9. See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.
10. The only comprehensive article to date on the law of directed trustees was
published in 1977. See DirectedTrusts Under ERISA, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 535 (1977) [hereinafter DirectedTrusts]. More recent articles have discussed the
topic of directed trustees in the context of pass-through tender offers to plan
participants, see Ronald S. Rizzo & James F. Carey, Reich v. NationsBank of Georgia,
N.A., 4 ERISA Lit. Rep. No. 4, 14-21 (1996); William P. Wade, Employee Benefit
PlansIn Control Contests: An Analysis ofParticipant'PassThrough' Arrangements,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2
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article is an introductory primer to the sections of ERISA which are most
relevant to judicial decisions concerning directed trustees. Part II reviews the
major federal court decisions addressing the duties of directed trustees under
ERISA. This review of the case law indicates that early federal court
decisions established fundamental principles concerning the fiduciary
responsibilities of directed trustees that were consistent with the statutory
language and the goals of ERISA. Two relatively recent judicial opinions,
FirsTierBank v. Zeller" and Maniace v. Commerce Bank, 2 are examined
and criticized as contrary to ERISA's statutory scheme, legislative history and
the purposes underlying the statute. Part III of the article analyzes and
attempts to answer the key issues raised by FirsTierBank and Maniace in two
contexts: (1) when the person directing the trustee is a plan participant; and
(2) when the person directing the trustee is a non-participant plan fiduciary.
Part IV of the article proposes a general model of the fiduciary responsibilities
of a directed trustee under ERISA when acting at the direction of a nonparticipant plan fiduciary. The model develops an internally consistent theory
of the relationships between the multiple statutory sections of ERISA
governing the conduct of directed trustees. The model is designed to assist the
federal courts and practitioners in analyzing the fiduciary responsibilities of
directed trustees under ERISA in a manner that is consistent with the statutory
language of ERISA, its carefully crafted allocation of fiduciary
responsibilities, and its purpose of protecting plan participants.
I. INTRODUCTORY PRIMER TO ERISA
Federal courts addressing the fiduciary responsibilities of directed trustees
of employee benefit plans typically look to three sections of ERISA. 3 These

17 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1290 (1990), and plans operating under ERISA § 404(c),
see Now That The 404(c) RegulationsAre Final, Who Cares?, 1 ERISA Lit. Rep. No.

11, 15 (1992).
11. 16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1994).
12. 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994).
13. With certain limited exceptions, ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate
to" employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). The
scope of ERISA preemption in the past has been broadly construed by the Supreme
Court. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (A State law "relates to"
an ERISA plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.); Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (A State law may "relate to" an ERISA

plan, and thereby be preempted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect
such plans, or the effect is only indirect.). Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated
a willingness to limit the scope of ERISA preemption and uphold state laws producing
only an "indirect economic effect" on ERISA plans. See New York State Conference

of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1680,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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sections are: (1) section 3(21)(A), 4 the definition of a "fiduciary"; (2) section
403(a)(1), 5 which describes the role of a directed trustee; and (3) section
404(a)(1), 16 which defines general fiduciary duties under ERISA. Not
usually discussed by the courts, but of equal importance, is section 405(a), 7
which describes the liability of a fiduciary for a breach of duty by a cofiduciary, and section 409(a), 8 pursuant to which a fiduciary is personally
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty. Finally, because ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme is a critical component of the statute, section 502(a), 9
which prescribes the types of civil actions available under ERISA, is briefly
described.
A. Section 3(21)(A): Definition of a Fiduciary
The starting point for determining the duties of a directed trustee is the
definition of a "fiduciary" contained in ERISA section 3(21)(A). Under this
definition, a "person' 2° is a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan to the
extent that person exercises any discretionary authority, discretionary control,
or discretionary responsibility respecting the management or administration of
the plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of the plan's assets.2'

1683 (1995). State laws that mandate certain benefit structures, affect plan
administration, or provide alternate enforcement mechanisms would still be preempted
under the new Supreme Court standard articulated in the Travelers decision. See id.
at 1678, 1683. Thus, state law claims against directed trustees of ERISA plans for
breach of duty would appear to continue to be preempted by ERISA. See Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49 (1987) (State common law causes of action
which "relate to" benefit plans are preempted); TravelersIns. Co., 115 S.Ct. at 1683
(prior rulings holding that ERISA preempts direct regulation of benefit plans are
unaffected by Travelers holding, citing Pilot Life v. Dedeaux).

14. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
15. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994).
16. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
17. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
18. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
19. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
20. ERISA defines a "person" as "an individual, partnership, joint venture,
corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated
organization, association, or employee organization." Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9)
(1994). This definition of "person" will be used throughout the article.
21. The complete text of ERISA § 3(21)(A) reads:
[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2
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The case law construing the definition of a fiduciary has focused
primarily on the discretionary functions with respect to plan management and
administration which qualify a person as an ERISA fiduciary.' A person's
fiduciary status under the discretionary conduct part of the definition is
coterminous with the person's exercise of discretionary authority respecting
Thus, under the
the management or administration of the plan.2
discretionary prong of the definition, a person can be a fiduciary when
exercising the requisite discretionary authority, but may also be a nonfiduciary for other purposes. 4 In contrast, under the plain language of the
definition, a person who exercises any authority or control (discretionary or
not) with respect to the management or disposition of plan assets is a
fiduciary.25

or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan....
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). This article does not address the duties
of fiduciary investment advisors referred to in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (1994).
22. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984) (exercise
of discretionary authority respecting plan management and disposition of plan assets
made party a fiduciary); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding union representative was a fiduciary because of exercise of discretionary
authority in influencing local unions to choose certain dental association); Pohl v.
National Ben. Consultants, 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992) ("ERISA makes the
existence of discretion a sine qua non of fiduciary duty"); O'Neil v. Davis, 721 F.
Supp. 1013, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (voting of shares held as plan assets is fiduciary act
of plan management).
23. See, e.g., Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan, 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (5th Cir. 1986) (person is a fiduciary only with
respect to those aspects of the plan over which he exercises authority or control);
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133-35 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendants were fiduciaries to
the extent they performed fiduciary functions); Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669
(8th Cir. 1992) (ERISA fiduciary is liable only to the extent he exercises discretionary
control or has discretionary management authority).
24. See, e.g., Corrigan,793 F.2d at 1459-60 (ERISA recognizes that a person
may be a fiduciary for some purposes and not others); Leigh, 727 F.2d at 133 (same).
25. See infra discussion and notes 94-95.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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B. Section 403(a)(1): Directed Trustees
ERISA section 403(a) requires that the assets of an employee benefit
plan, with certain limited exceptions, 26 must be held in trust by one or more
trustees. Each trustee must be named in the written documents governing the
plan and trust or appointed by a person who is a "named fiduciary 27 under
the plan. Under ERISA section 403(a), a trustee has exclusive discretionary
authority over the assets of the plan, unless the plan expressly provides that
the trustee is subject to the direction of a named fiduciary (hereinafter referred
to as a "directing fiduciary"). The plan participants themselves can be the
named plan fiduciaries for purposes of directing the trustee.28 Under ERISA
section 403(a)(1), a directed trustee is required to follow the "proper"

26. ERISA § 403(b), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1994), excepts
the following from the trust requirement: (1) plan assets which are insurance contracts
or policies issued by an insurance company qualified to do business in a state; (2)
plan assets held by an insurance company; (3) "Keogh" plans under Internal Revenue
Code § 401(c), I.R.C. § 401(c) (1994), for self-employed individuals to the extent that
the assets are held in a qualifying custodial account under Internal Revenue Code
§ 401(f), I.R.C. § 401(f) (1994); (4) individual retirement accounts under Internal
Revenue Code § 408, I.R.C. § 408 (1994), to the extent that the assets are held in a
qualifying custodial account under Internal Revenue Code § 408(h), I.R.C. § 408(h)
(1994); and (5) assets of plans of tax-exempt employers under Internal Revenue Code
§ 403(b), I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994), to the extent such assets are held in a qualifying
custodial account under Internal Revenue Code § 403(b)(7), I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994).
Section 403(b)(4) also permits the Secretary of Labor to exempt from the trust
requirement any plan which is not subject to ERISA's requirements for minimum
participation, vesting, funding, or defined benefit plan insurance termination provisions.
To date, no such exemptions have been issued, although the Department of Labor has
extended indefinitely its "non-enforcement policy" with respect to the trust requirement
for "cafeteria" plans under Internal Revenue Code § 125, I.R.C. § 125 (1994). See
Pension And Welfare Benefits Administration Notice, Extension of Enforcement Policy
With Respect to Welfare Plans With Participant Contributions, 58 Fed. Reg. 459
(1993) (proposed Aug. 27, 1993).
27. A "named fiduciary," defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), is a fiduciary who
is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan,
is identified as a fiduciary by an employer or employee organization with respect to
a plan.
28. See Reich v. NationsBank of Georgia, N.A., Civ. A. 1:92-CV-1474-HTW,
1995 WL 316550, at *3 (N.D. Ga. March 29, 1995); DOL Info. Ltr., 22 Pen. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 2249, 2250 (Sept. 28, 1995) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Letter]; DOL Info.
Ltr., 1994 ERISA LEXIS 51 (Aug. 19,1994) [hereinafter International Games Letter];
DOL Op. Ltr., 16 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 390 (Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Polaroid
Letter].
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2
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directions of the directing fiduciary, so long as those directions are "made in
accordance with the terms of the plan" and are "not contrary to" ERISA.2 9
Much of the controversy surrounding the scope of fiduciary responsibility
for a directed trustee centers around the disputed meaning of the language of
section 403(a)(1)." The case law and Department of Labor interpretations
of the meaning of section 403(a)(1) vary significantly.3' The root of the
problem lies in the fact that there is no guidance in the statute as to what
constitutes a "proper" direction. Furthermore, there is no guidance in the
statute concerning to what lengths the directed trustee must go to ascertain
whether the direction is in accordance with the terms of the plan and ERISA.

C. Section 404(a)(1): FiduciaryDuties
ERISA section 404(a)(1) establishes four fundamental duties governing
the conduct of fiduciaries.32 The legislative history of ERISA section 404

29. The text of ERISA § 403(a) reads:
[A]II assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one
or more trustees. Such trustee or trustees shall be either named in the trust
instrument or in the plan instrument described in section 402(a) or
appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary, and upon acceptance of
being named or appointed, the trustee or trustees shall have exclusive
authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan, except
to the extent that(1) the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees
are subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a
trustee, in which case the trustees shall be subject to proper
directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance with
the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this
[Act], ...
Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
30. See discussion infra Part III.B.
31. See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.B.3.
32. The complete text of ERISA § 404(a)(1) reads:
Subject to sections 403(c) and (d), 4042, and 4044, a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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indicates that Congress intended section 404 to codify the principles of
fiduciary conduct developed under the common law of trusts, but with
modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans.3 Under ERISA
section 404(a)(1)(A), a fiduciary generally must discharge all of his duties
with respect to a plan "solely in the interest" of the participants and
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan. The courts have construed the phrase "solely in the interest" to mean
that the fiduciary must discharge his duties "with an eye single to the interests
'
This duty is commonly referred to
of the participants and beneficiaries. 34
3
5
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) requires
as the fiduciary's "duty of loyalty.
the fiduciary to discharge his duties with the "care, skill, prudence and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of like character and with like aims." This duty is commonly
referred to as the ERISA "prudent man rule" or "duty of care."36 ERISA
37
section 404(a)(1)(C), commonly known as the "duty of diversification,
requires the fiduciary to diversify the investments of the plan prudently under
the circumstances so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
Finally, ERISA
circumstances it is clearly imprudent to do so.
section 404(a)(1)(D) requires the fiduciary to discharge his duties in
accordance with the documents governing the plan insofar as such documents

(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of this title or Title IV.
Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464951; S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4866; H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076; Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d
1455, 1464 n.15 (5th Cir. 1983); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 n.19 (7th Cir.
1984).
34. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. See id. at 271; Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978).
36. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983);
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983).
37. See, e.g., Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers
& Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Haw. 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2
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are consistent with the provisions of ERISA. This duty requires a fiduciary
to not follow any terms of the plan which are contrary to ERISA. 8
The statutory language does not address how the broad fiduciary duties
prescribed in ERISA section 404(a)(1) are to be reconciled with the narrow
duties of a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1). Judicial attempts
to interpret and apply section 404(a)(1) to directed trustees have resulted in
conflicting decisions concerning the fiduciary responsibilities of directed
trustees.39

D. Section 405(a): Co-FiduciaryLiability
ERISA section 405(a) 4' describes the circumstances under which a
fiduciary will be liable for a breach of duty by a co-fiduciary. Under ERISA
sections 405(a)(1) and (3), a fiduciary is liable if he has actual knowledge of
the breach by the co-fiduciary and knowingly participates in or undertakes to
conceal the breach, or fails to make reasonable efforts to remedy the breach.
Absent actual knowledge of the co-fiduciary's breach of duty, the fiduciary
will still be liable under ERISA section 405(a)(2) if he fails to comply with
his duties under ERISA section 404(a)(1) and thereby enables the co-fiduciary
to commit a breach of duty.
A directed trustee by definition under ERISA section 403(a)(1) always
acts at the direction of another plan fiduciary.4 ' Consequently, section 405(a)
would appear to be significant for purposes of determining the liability of a
directed trustee.

38. See authorities cited infra note 168.
39. See discussion infra Parts II.B & III.B.
40. The text of ERISA § 405(a) reads:
(a) In addition to any liability which he may have under any other
provisions of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for
a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the
same plan in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to
conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act

or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1) in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a
breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary,
unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy
the breach.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 61

E. Section 409(a): FiduciaryLiability
ERISA section 409(a) makes a fiduciary personally liable to restore to the
plan: (1) any losses resulting from the fiduciary's breach of his duties under
ERISA; or (2) any profits of the fiduciary made through the use of plan assets
by the fiduciary.42 ERISA section 409(a) also authorizes any other equitable
or remedial relief as the court deems appropriate, such as the removal of the
fiduciary. ERISA section 409(a) does not authorize any sort of monetary
relief to a party other than the plan, such as an individual damage award to a
plan participant.43
ERISA section 409(a) is significant in the directed trustee context for two
reasons. First, this section establishes the personal liability of the directed
trustee for a breach of fiduciary duty. Second, this section, along with ERISA
section 502(a), reflects the practical significance of the status of a directed
trustee as a fiduciary under ERISA. If a directed trustee is a fiduciary, the
plan may recover against the directed trustee personally for losses incurred or
profits obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty. Conversely, if a directed
trustee is not a fiduciary, the plan may not recover against the directed trustee
any losses incurred or profits obtained through the directed trustee's
misconduct.
F. Section 502(a): Civil Enforcement Actions
ERISA section 502(a) authorizes specific types of civil causes of actions
which may be brought under ERISA. 44 There are no "implied" civil causes

42. The text of ERISA § 409(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to
the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
43. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-42
(1985).
44. The text of ERISA § 502(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
for appropriate relief under section 409;
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2
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of actions outside of the statutory civil actions recognized under ERISA
section 502(a).4" Furthermore, ERISA preempts claims based on state laws
or regulations.46 Consequently, if a plan participant cannot fit his claim into
one of ERISA's statutory causes of actions discussed in section 502(a), he will
be left without a remedy under either federal or state law.47
ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and (3) are the most relevant civil enforcement
actions for purposes of directed trustees. Section 502(a)(2) authorizes a plan
participant to bring a civil action against a fiduciary for appropriate plan-wide
relief under ERISA section 409(a).48 ERISA section 502(a)(3) is a "catchall" provision49 authorizing a plan participant to bring a civil action to enjoin
any act or practice in violation of the term of the plan or ERISA, or to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief. °
Section 502(a) is significant in the directed trustee context principally
because it represents the consequences of a determination that a directed
trustee is a fiduciary under ERISA. A "fiduciary" directed trustee may be
sued by a plan participant, either on behalf of the plan under ERISA section
502(a)(2)5' or, individually, under ERISA section 502(a)(3)," for a breach
of fiduciary duty. If, however, the court rules that the directed trustee is not
a fiduciary, the plan participant is without a cause of action under ERISA and
any state laws claims are preempted-in short, the plan participant has no
recourse against the directed trustee. This significant consequence appears to
have been overlooked in judicial decisions holding that a directed trustee is
not a fiduciary. 3

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or
the terms of this plan.

Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
45. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-48.

46. See authorities discussed supranote 13.
47. This result,known as "betrayal without a remedy," is a common phenomenon
in ERISA litigation. See, e.g., Betrayal Without Remedy--Part V1: The Recent Non-

3rd CircuitDecisions, 3 ERISA Lit. Rep. No. 3, 9-17 (1994) (seventh article in an
ongoing series discussing "betrayal without a remedy" cases).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).
49. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1075 (1996).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
51. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48
(1985).
52. See Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1075.

53. See infra note 84 and text accompanying notes 87-89.
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II. REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW ON DIRECTED TRUSTEES
Cases addressing the duties of directed trustees under ERISA are sparse.
Two major early cases in the directed trustee area are Newton v. Van
Otterloo54 and Ershick v. United Missouri Bank.55 In both of these cases
the courts assumed, without discussion of the issue, that the directed trustee
was a "fiduciary" under ERISA. The court's analysis in each of these early
decisions focused on the degree of deference the directed trustee must give to
the direction provided to the directed trustee by another plan fiduciary who
was not a plan participant. In each instance the court ruled that, absent actual
knowledge on the part of the directed trustee that the direction was a breach
of duty by the directing fiduciary, the directed trustee was entitled to rely
upon the direction and was not liable for carrying out the instructions of the
directing fiduciary.
Two recent Eighth Circuit decisions, FirsTier Bank v. Zeller5 6 and
Maniace v. Commerce Bank,57 have created confusion concerning the
principles established by the early cases. These Eighth Circuit decisions have
reached opposite conclusions on two fundamental issues concerning directed
trustees: (1) the status of a directed trustee as a fiduciary for purposes of
ERISA; and (2) the degree of deference the directed trustee must give to the
direction. The language used by the Eighth Circuit in these decisions
illustrates the need for a thorough analysis and clarification of the law of
directed trustees under ERISA which is grounded in ERISA's statutory
language, legislative history, and the remedial purposes underlying the statute.
A. The Early Directed Trustee Cases
1. Newton v. Van Otterloo
Newton v. Van Otterloo 8 addressed the duty of a directed trustee with
respect to voting directions for the election of corporate directors. The case
has enormous practical significance because it represents a situation often
encountered by directed trustees of employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs")
holding as the primary plan asset the stock of a non-publicly traded company.
In Newton, the ESOP held eighty-one percent of the company's
outstanding stock. Under the terms of the ESOP the plan participants were
permitted to vote directly the shares of stock allocated to their accounts for the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
948 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1991).
16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 194 (1994).
40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1964 (1995).
756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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election of corporate directors. The ESOP committee was the named fiduciary
responsible for directing the trustee how to vote the remaining unallocated
shares. The unallocated shares controlled by the ESOP committee represented
nearly seventy percent of the outstanding stock of the company. The
participants' allocated shares represented a little more than eleven percent of
the outstanding stock. The company's president personally owned eighteen
percent of the company's stock outside of the ESOP and the remaining one
percent was held by 11 other individuals.
The ESOP committee consisted of five members. Two members were
hourly union employees and three members were management employees,
consisting of the chief financial officer, the personnel manager, and the
personnel manager's secretary. The president of the company, whose
management was being challenged by the union, recommended that the ESOP
committee abstain from voting the unallocated ESOP shares and any allocated
shares not voted by participants for the election of corporate directors. The
ESOP committee followed this recommendation and ordered the ESOP
directed trustee to abstain from voting the unallocated and allocated but not
voted shares. The directed trustee followed the direction to abstain from
voting the shares.59 As a result, the incumbent management slate of
directors, which included the president, was reelected on the strength of the
president's personal share ownership of eighteen percent of the outstanding
stock of the company.
Four ESOP participants sued the management members of the ESOP
committee and the president, alleging that they manipulated the voting of the
ESOP share to retain incumbent management. The participants claimed that
the management members of the ESOP committee were interested in
preserving their management jobs and thus had a conflict of interest that
prevented them from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the ESOP participants.
The ESOP participants also sued the ESOP directed trustee, alleging that the
directed trustee violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a)(1)
and was liable as a co-fiduciary under ERISA section 405(a) for participating
in the committee's breach of fiduciary duty by following the direction to
abstain from voting the shares.
The court did not question the premise underlying the participant's claims
against the directed trustee under ERISA sections 404(a)(1) and 405(a)-that
the directed trustee was a fiduciary. Instead, the court focused on the
standards for a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1), namely that
the directed trustee "ordinarily is bound to carry out instructions from a plan's
named fiduciaries, but only if the instructions are proper and are not contrary
The participants argued that the committee's direction to
to ERISA."'

at 1132.
59. See id.
60. Id.
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abstain from voting nearly seventy percent of the company's stock was so
unusual that the directed trustee should not have followed the ESOP
committee's direction.
The court rejected the participants' claim, relying on the narrow standard
of ERISA section 403(a)(1). The court found that the terms of the plan gave
the ESOP committee discretion to decide how to vote the unallocated shares,
and that a decision to abstain was within this discretionary power. Therefore,
the direction to the directed trustee to abstain on its face was in accordance
with the terms of the plan. The more difficult question addressed by the court
was whether, under these circumstances, the direction to abstain was contrary
to ERISA due to the apparent conflict of interest on the part of the
management members of the ESOP committee. Here the court relied on the
earlier part of its opinion, which found that the management committee
members with divided loyalties nevertheless could have directed the trustee to
vote or abstain from voting the shares if, after an "independent and scrupulous
investigation" of their options, the management members determined that the
direction to abstain was in the best interests of the plan participants. The
incumbent management members of the management members of the
committee had not conducted such an investigation. The court found that this
failure on the part of the management members of the committee was not fatal
to the directed trustee. Rather, the court reasoned, had the ESOP committee
conducted such an investigation, the direction to abstain would not have been
contrary to ERISA. Significantly, the court did not impose upon the directed
trustee a duty to ask the committee if the committee had, in fact, conducted
such an investigation. Instead, the court ruled that because the directed trustee
lacked actual knowledge that the ESOP committee did not conduct the proper
investigation, the directed trustee was bound by the plan document and ERISA
section 403(a)(1) to follow the committee's direction. Therefore, the court
concluded, there was no basis upon which the directed trustee could be held
liable for a violation of ERISA.6 1
2. Ershick v. United MissouriBank
Ershick v. United Missouri Bank 2 is significant because it involved a
claim against a directed trustee for following a direction concerning the
purchase and sale of plan assets. The directed trustee in Ershick again was the
trustee of an ESOP established for the employees of a privately-held company.
The plan documents stated that the ESOP' was intended to be invested
primarily in company stock and expressly permitted investment of up to 100%

Id. at 1132-33.
62. 948 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1991).
61.
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of the ESOP funds in company stock.63 Under the terms of the plan
document, the company served as the plan administrator with the express
power to direct the trustee "with regard to purchases of Company stock and
the fair market value thereof."' The plan document also stated that one of
the duties of the directed trustee was to invest any or all of the ESOP funds
in company stock, but that all purchases and sales of company stock must be
made only at the direction of the plan administrator, who would be responsible
for determining the terms for such purchases at prices that, in the'best
judgment of the administrator, did not exceed fair market value. 5
The company prospered until the death of its founder in 1981.
Thereafter, the fortunes of the company declined precipitously under the
direction of the new chief executive officer. While the company fortunes
were declining, the bank serving as the ESOP's directed trustee and as a
lender to the company, lowered the company's borrowing limit in response to
the company's declining financial situation. At the direction of the company
the ESOP directed trustee purchased 410 shares of company stock in 1983 at
a price of $300 per share and 899 shares in 1984 at a price of $285 per share.
These purchases made the ESOP the majority stockholder of the company,
effectively consolidating control of the company in incumbent management.
Before carrying out each of these purchase directives, the ESOP directed
trustee first ascertained that the stock purchase price was supported by a
current appraisal performed by an independent appraiser who was not
affiliated with the company.
The plaintiffs in the case were former company employees who were
fully vested ESOP participants. Upon learning that in 1986 that their ESOP
account balances (consisting almost entirely of company stock) had declined
to seventy-five percent of their former values, the former employees sued the
ESOP directed trustee, claiming that it had violated the prudence requirement
of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) by continuing to invest in company stock in
1983 and 1984 when the financial condition of the company was deteriorating.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the directed trustee should have attempted to
sell some or all of the company stock held by the ESOP once the bank's
commercial lending department had learned of the declining financial position
of the company and in response lowered the company's borrowing limit.
As in Newton v. Van Otterloo,the court accepted the underlying premise
of the plaintiffs' claim that the directed trustee was a fiduciary and therefore
was subject to the fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a)(1). And

63. ERISA § 404(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1994), expressly
exempts employee stock ownership plans from the prudent diversification requirements
of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1994).
64. Ershick,948 F.2d at 662-63.
at 663.
65. Id.
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again, just like the court in Newton v. Van Otterloo, the Ershick court relied
on the more narrow duties of a directed trustee under ERISA section
403(a)(1). The Ershick court ruled that the purchase directions to the ESOP
trustee were made in accordance with the terms of the plan and were not
contrary to ERISA, and concluded that the directed trustee was not liable for
following the directions to purchase company stock. A key factual finding
relied upon by the Ershick court was a lack of evidence that the directed
trustee had actual knowledge of the mismanagement of the company by the
new chief executive officer at the time the purchase directions were given. 6
The court also relied on the lower court's factual finding that a "Chinese wall"
between the bank's commercial lending and trust departments prevented the
commercial loan department from communicating the company's poor loan
performance to the trust department. 67 The court suggested that this Chinese
wall prevented the directed trustee (in reality the trust department of the bank)
from having access to company financial information that would have
prompted the directed trustee to question the direction to purchase company
stock. The court's opinion did not address what, if any, duty the directed
trustee would have under ERISA had the trust department had actual
knowledge of the company's declining financial situation.
3. Fundamental Principles Established By The Early Cases
Newton and Ershickrecognized several fundamental principles governing
directed trustees under ERISA. First, directed trustees were assumed to be
fiduciaries under ERISA, and, therefore, were subject to fiduciary duties and
liability under ERISA. Second, although the relationships among the relevant
statutory sources of such fiduciary duties and liabilities, ERISA sections
403(a)(1), 404(a)(1), and 405(a), had not been clearly articulated, it appeared
that, in the context where the direction was made by another plan fiduciary,
the courts viewed the narrow duties of the directed trustee under ERISA
section 403(a)(1) as controlling over the general fiduciary duties described in
ERISA section 404(a)(1). As a result, if the direction given to the directed
trustee by the named plan fiduciary on its face was in accordance with the
terms of the plan and was not contrary to ERISA, the directed trustee did not
have a duty to inquire beyond the facially valid direction and would not be
held liable for following the direction. If, however, the directed trustee had
actual knowledge that the direction was a breach of duty by the directing
fiduciary, the directed trustee would be held liable for following the direction.
These fundamental principles, although not always favorable to the
participants, had the virtue of providing relatively clear rules that could be

66. Id at 667-68.
67. Id. at 665.
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readily ascertained and applied by directed trustees. These "bright line" rules
subsequently have been blurred by the apparently contradictory twin Eighth
Circuit decisions of FirsTierBank v. Zeller and Maniace v. Commerce Bank.
B. Recent Case Law Developments
1. FirsTierBank v. Zeller
As in Ershick, the bank, acting as directed trustee in FirsTierBank v.
Zeller,68 was both a lender to the company and the trustee of the company's
profit sharing plan. The company, deeply in debt and in a precarious financial
condition, lacked the cash to meet a $600,000 loan repayment to the bank.
After exhausting all possible sources of cash, the company still needed
$100,000 to repay the loan. Four days before the loan payment was due, the
company's president had the board of directors remove the bank as trustee and
substitute the president of the company as trustee of the profit sharing plan.
Once installed as trustee, the company president intended to remove the cash
held in the profit sharing plan participant accounts and substitute annuities.
The bank trustee advised the president that the annuity substitution proposal
was impermissible. The trustee also refused to accept its removal as trustee
because the bank officer in charge knew of the company's heavy indebtedness
and feared misuse of the profit sharing plan assets by the company
president.69
A few days later, the company's president met with the profit sharing
plan participants and persuaded them that the company would fail unless the
participants borrowed the cash from their individual plan accounts and
reloaned the money to the company. The company president then wrote to the
trustee and directed the trustee to make loans to each plan participant pursuant
to the terms of the plan, which provided that the "Trustee may, and shall at
the direction of the Company, make a loan or loans to a Participant." The
trustee promptly prepared the plan loan documents, obtained the signatures of
the individual plan participants on installment notes secured by their interests
in the plan, and disbursed loan proceeds totaling $93,950 to the individual
plan participants.7 °
The participants each transferred their loan proceeds to the president's
personal account at another bank, receiving in return promissory notes from
the company and the president. The president then wrote a $240,000 check
on his personal account to the company, which used the money to repay the
loan to the bank trustee. Shortly thereafter, the company went into bankruptcy
68. 16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 909.
70. Id at 910.
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and its assets were sold. Both the plan loans to the participants and the
participant loans to the company president were never repaid.7
In a preemptive strike, the bank trustee filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration of its status with respect to the plan. The .plan
participants counterclaimed against the bank trustee, alleging that the trustee
violated ERISA by knowingly making or permitting improper plan loans. The
district court found in favor of the bank trustee on the ERISA claims. One
of the issues on appeal to the Eighth Circuit was whether the bank as a
directed trustee had breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by following
the directions of the plan participants to make the loans.
The Eighth Circuit characterizedthe critical legal issue in the case as "the
precise nature and extent of FirsTier's duty as trustee in lending Plan assets
to the Participants. "72 The directed trustee's first contention was that it had
no fiduciary duty at all with respect to the participant loans because under the
terms of the plan the loans were made at the direction of the company and
therefore the trustee did not exercise fiduciary discretion in making the loans.
The Eighth Circuit properly rejected this contention based on the definition of
a fiduciary in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i), stating:
Note that this section imposes fiduciary duties [not] only if one exercises
discretionaryauthority or control over plan management, but imposes those
duties whenever one deals with plan assets. This distinction is not
accidental-it reflects the high standard of care trust law imposes upon
those who handle money or other assets on behalf of another.'
The Eighth Circuit next turned to the duties of the directed trustee; in
particular, whether the directed trustee had a duty to inquire behind the
direction to make the loans to the plan participants. For guidance, the court
looked to a directed trustee's duty of inquiry developed under the common
law of trusts. The court described a directed trustee's common law duty as
follows:
Where the holder of the power [to direct the trustee] holds it as a fiduciary,
the trustee is not justified in complying with his directions if the trustee
knows or ought to know that the holder of the power is violating his duty
to the beneficiaries as fiduciary in giving the direction.74

71. Id
72. Id at 910-11.
73. Id, at 911 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 95 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
74. Id.at 911 (quoting 2 AusTIN WAKEMAN SCOTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER,
ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 185, at 574 (4th ed. 1987)).
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The Eighth Circuit then drew the following conclusion:
We conclude from the limitation in [ERISA section 403(a)(1)] to directions
"not contrary to this chapter" that Congress adopted this standard [the
common law] in ERISA. Thus, an ERISA trustee who deals with plan
assets in accordance with proper directions of another fiduciary is not
relieved of its fiduciary duties to conform to the prudent man standard of
care, see [ERISA section 404(a)]; to attempt to remedy known breaches of
duty by other fiduciaries, see [ERISA section 405(a)]; and to avoid
prohibited transactions, see [ERISA section 406]. 7'
The common law "standard" referred to by the court in the above-quoted
passage is the duty imposed on directed trustees under the common law of
trusts to make reasonable inquiry and investigation to determine whether the
directing fiduciary is violating his fiduciary duty in making the direction.
With this statement the Eighth Circuit appears to have altered the duties of
directed trustees under ERISA in a manner which, as discussed in great detail
below, Congress never intended. Moreover, the court failed to address and
reconcile the apparent conflict between a directed trustee's limited duties
under ERISA section 403(a)(1) and the broad general fiduciary duties created
under ERISA section 404(a).
Significantly, the Eighth Circuit never addressed the obvious issue of
whether, applying its newly created standard of reasonable inquiry and
investigation, the directed trustee's conduct in making the participant loans
violated its duty of prudence under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B). The
participants contended that this duty of reasonable inquiry arose because the
trustee had rejected an improper attempt to substitute the company president
as trustee, and the trustee knew that the company was in financial difficulty
and was deeply indebted. Had the trustee inquired, the participants argued,
it would have learned that the loans to the participants were really indirect
loans from the plan to the company in violation of ERISA. Perhaps realizing
that it had painted itself into a comer by imposing a duty of reasonable
inquiry upon the directed trustee, the court again looked to the common law
of trusts for an exception to the duty it had just created. The Eighth Circuit
found such an exception based on the fact that the directed trustee had made
the loans not just at the direction of the company, but also at the request of
the plan participants, the "beneficiaries" of the trust. Using this factual
distinction, the court again relied on another rule under the common law of
trusts, namely that "[w]hen acting at the direction of the ultimate beneficiary
of a trust, the trustee's fiduciary duty is satisfied if it simply complies with a

75. Id. (emphasis added) (citations to ERISA statutory sections omitted).
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direction that does not violate the terms of the trust."'76 The court then drew
an analogy between participants in an ERISA plan and the beneficiaries of a
common law trust. Based on this analogy, the court held that ERISA did not
require the directed trustee to reasonably inquire of the plan participants the
purposes for which they were borrowing the plan assets.
FirsTierBank was correct in its ruling that despite a lack of discretionary
authority, a directed trustee is still a fiduciary as defined by ERISA section
3(21)(A)(i). The other key ruling in the case, applying the principles
developed under the common law of trusts to ERISA directed trustees,
represents a fundamental change in the law of directed trustees under ERISA.
As discussed below, this judicial incorporation of a directed trustee's duties
under the common law into ERISA undermines ERISA's goals in certain
instances by simultaneously overburdening the directed trustee while failing
sufficiently to protect the plan participants.77
2. Maniace v. Commerce Bank
In Maniace v. Commerce Bank,78 the Eighth Circuit had an opportunity
to revisit the issues addressed in FirsTierBank. Maniace involved a privatelyheld company with an ESOP. Under the terms of the plan document, the
trustee of the ESOP had general investment authority, but was a directed
trustee subject to directions of the ESOP committee with respect to purchases
or sales of company stock.
After establishing the ESOP the company went into a decade of decline,
culminating in bankruptcy in 1989. The directed trustee essentially took a
"hands-off' attitude toward company management until less than a year prior
to the bankruptcy filing. The directed trustee then became concerned about
the financial condition of the company and resigned as trustee.79
After the company's collapse, the ESOP participants sued the directed
trustee on two grounds. First, the participants argued that the directed trustee
had failed to fulfill its fiduciary obligation to prudently manage and protect
plan assets. 0 Second, the participants argued that the directed trustee
breached its fiduciary duty when it knew of, but failed to remedy, alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty by the ESOP committee. The court characterized

76. FirsTier Bank, 16 F.3d at 912 (citing 2 AUsTIN WAKEMAN
F. FRATCHER, ScOTr ON TRUSTS § 185, at 575 (4th ed. 1987)).
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77. See discussion infra Part III.B.
78. 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994).
79. Id at 265-66.
80. Although the opinion does not state under which section of ERISA the
participants made this claim, presumably it was under ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) (1994).
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the participants' claims as primarily involving the directed trustee's retention
of large amounts of company stock despite the stock's declining value, the
directed trustee's overall lack of participation in company finances, and
internal disputes concerning the management of the company. 8
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by finding that the ESOP trustee
was a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1). The court then
characterized the issue in the case as one of determining the duties of a
directed trustee under ERISA. The participants urged that the fiduciary duty
of prudence under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) should apply, and that the
directed trustee violated this duty of prudence by retaining the company stock
as a plan asset when the stock was declining in value and by choosing not to
become involved in company financial matters. Rather than dismissing this
argument as imposing an obligation beyond the scope of a directed trustee's
duty under ERISA section 403(a)(1), the Eighth Circuit held that the trustee
was not afiduciary at all under the definition in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i)
because the directed trustee did not exercise discretion with respect to
purchases and sales of company stock by the ESOP." In so doing, the court
did not address the second part of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i), correctly relied
upon by the court in FirsTier Bank, stating that a directed trustee is a
fiduciary to the extent he exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of plan assets.83
Having concluded that the directed trustee was not a fiduciary, the Eighth
Circuit returned to ERISA section 403(a)(1) to determine if the trustee
followed its statutory mandate to act only upon directions from the ESOP
committee which were made in accordance with the terms of the plan and
which were not contrary to ERISA.84 Here the Eighth Circuit again departed
from its prior ruling in FirsTierBank. The Maniace court stated:

81. Maniace, 40 F.3d at 266.
82. Id. at 267; contra John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1993) (emphasizing that under ERISA's definition of a
fiduciary, any exercise of authority or control over plan assets gives rise to fiduciary
status).
83. Prior to Maniace, there appears to have been only one reported decision in
which a district court had ruled, without analysis, that a directed trustee was not a
fiduciary under ERISA. See Jenkins v. Bradshaw, 5 E.B.C. 2754 (W.D. Wash. 1984)
(directed trustee was custodian, not fiduciary).
84. The court appears to have overlooked the significance of its ruling that the
directed trustee was not a fiduciary. Having so held, the participants' claims should
have been dismissed because they had no cause of action under ERISA against a nonfiduciary and all state law claims would be preempted. Hence, the participants would
have been left without any possible remedy.
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The obligations of a directed trustee are something less than that owed by
typical fiduciaries. [The directed trustee] was not required to weigh the
merits of an investment in [company] stock against all other investment
options every time it was directed to purchase said stock by the Committee.
Section [403(a)(1)] establishes the standard to be followed by directed
trustees, and under the present facts it cannot be said that the purchase of
[company] stock violated the Plan or was contrary to ERISA 8
The Maniace court's analysis implies a rejection of FirsTier Bank's
incorporation of the directed trustee's common law duty of reasonable inquiry
into ERISA. The Maniace court's analysis also represents a return to the
fundamental principles of Newton and Ershick. The Maniace court
acknowledged the conflict with its FirsTierBank decision, but attempted to
distinguish FirsTierBank on the ground that the directed trustee of the profit
sharing plan in FirsTierBank had investment authority for all plan assets,
whereas the Maniace directed trustee did not have investment authority with
respect to the major asset of the ESOP, the company stock. 86 The Maniace
court added to the confusion by stating that it was "reaffirming" its ruling in
FirsTierBank that ERISA section 403(a)(1) modified, but did not eliminate,
the directed trustee's duty of prudence under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B).
The alternative, more probable reading of FirsTier Bank is that the court
rejectedERISA section 403(a)(1) as a potential limitation upon the general
fiduciary duties outlined in ERISA section 404(a)(1) when applied to a
directed trustee.
3. FirsTierBank And Maniace: Double Trouble For The Future
Both FirsTierBank and Maniace appear to contain fundamental errors
which, if not corrected by subsequent federal court decisions, will result in
federal case law on the duties of directed trustees that is contrary to ERISA's
carefully crafted statutory scheme, its legislative history, and the remedial
purposes underlying the statute. These fundamental errors lie in two key
areas: (1) the status of a directed trustee as an ERISA fiduciary; and (2) the
nature of the duties of a directed trustee under ERISA and the degree of
deference the directed trustee must afford the directions given to him.
If a directed trustee is not a fiduciary under ERISA section 3(21)(A), as
found by the Maniace court, the ramifications of this determination run
throughout the statute. A "nonfiduciary" directed trustee cannot be subject to
the fiduciary standards of ERISA section 404(a)(1) because these duties only

85. Maniace,40 F.3d at 268 (citing Ershick v. United Missouri Bank, 948 F.2d
660, 665 (10th Cir. 1991)).
86. Id.
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apply to afiduciary" Moreover, if a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, then
the directed trustee cannot be held personally liable under ERISA section
409(a) for his own breach of duty or vicariously liable for a breach of duty
by the directing fiduciary under ERISA section 405 because, again, these
sections only apply to afiduciary.88 Finally, if the directed trustee is not a
fiduciary, then the plan participants who are injured by the directed trustee's
conduct may be without a remedy under ERISA because ERISA section
9
502(a) does not permit a civil action against a nonfiduciary."
The consequences resulting from FirsTier Bank's incorporation into
ERISA of principles developed under the common law of trusts are more
subtle, but of equal significance. Imposing the common law duty of
independent inquiry upon a directed trustee when the direction is given by
another plan fiduciary undermines ERISA's carefully crafted statutory scheme
In addition, the
allocating fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities.9"
upon the directed
inquiry
independent
duty
of
law
common
imposition of the
trustee sets up an unnecessary dichotomy in the responsibilities of the directed
trustee depending upon whether the direction is given by the named fiduciary
or the named fiduciary's designated investment manager.9" These results are
contrary to the legislative history of ERISA describing the role of a directed
trustee vis-A-vis the other plan fiduciaries.92 FirsTierBank's incorporation
into ERISA of the common law rule that a directed trustee has no duty of
independent inquiry when the direction is given by a trust beneficiary is
equally unsatisfactory in the ERISA plan context. Such a rule provides no
protection to the plan participants in situations where they are potentially
vulnerable to coercion by their employer who sponsors the plan.93 This
danger is particularly acute when the plan holds as an asset shares of company
stock.
The confusion evidenced by the Eighth Circuit's decisions in FirsTier
Bank and Maniace appears to result from the lack of a cohesive theory of the
role of a directed trustee within ERISA's statutory scheme. Part III of this
article attempts to fill this intellectual void by analyzing the two key issues
upon which FirsTierBank and Maniace reached opposite conclusions.

87. See text of ERISA § 404(a)(1), quoted supra note 32.
88. See text of ERISA § 409(a), quoted supra note 42; text of ERISA § 405(a),
quoted supra note 40.
89. See infra discussion and notes 102-08.
90. See infra discussion and notes 158, 162-65.
91. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
92. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
93. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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III. RESOLVING THE KEY ISSUES RAISED BY
FIRSTIER BANK AND MANIACE

A. FiduciaryStatus of a Directed Trustee Under ERISA
Contrary to the decision in Maniacev. Commerce Bank, a directed trustee
is always a fiduciary under ERISA. This conclusion is supported by the plain
language of ERISA section 3(21)(A), the legislative history, and by the
purposes underlying the statute.
Under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i), discretionary authority is clearly not
required for fiduciary status. ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i) reads:
[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respectingmanagement

or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.... .'
Although the first part of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i) refers to
discretionary authority or control, the second part of ERISA section
3(21)(A)(i) defines a person as a fiduciary if he "exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of [the plan's] assets." By
virtue of the directed trustee's position as trustee of the trust holding the plan
assets, the trustee possesses the prerequisite authority or control over the plan
assets necessary to satisfy the defmition."
The few referencesto directed trustees in the legislative history of ERISA
are consistent with this interpretation that a directed trustee lacking
discretionary authority is nevertheless a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA. The

94. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
95. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S.
86, 95-96 (1993) (emphasizing that under ERISA's definition of a fiduciary, any
exercise of authority or control gives rise to fiduciary status); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8,
D-3, Q&A (1995) (some offices or positions of an employee benefit plan by their very
nature require persons who hold them to perform one or more of the functions
described in Section 3(21)(A)); AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28, at 2330 (emphasizing
that in the context of a directed trustee of an ESOP, any exercise of authority or
control respecting the management or disposition of ESOP assets was a fiduciary
action under ERISA § 3(21)); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE BENEFITs
LAw, 266-67 (1991) (position of trustee is necessarily a fiduciary one) [hereinafter
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW].
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House Conference Report accompanying ERISA discusses the duties of
directed trustees under the section entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility."96
There is no indication that the conferees contemplated excluding directed
trustees as fiduciaries.
The conclusion reached by the Maniace court-that a directed trustee is
not a fiduciary-would leave the plan participants without a remedy against
a wrong-doing trustee who misused plan assets.97 Such a result would be
absurd in light of the well-documented past abuses by plan trustees which
prompted the passage of ERISA.98 This result, which would be directly
contrary to the remedial purpose of protecting plan participants underlying the
statute," is a product of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme under ERISA
section 502(a). Under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, any claim by the
plan participants against the directed trustee must satisfy one of ERISA section
502(a)'s statutory causes of actions.1"u ERISA section 502(a) does not
authorize a participant to bring a civil cause of action against a nonfiduciary.'° The civil actions listed in ERISA section 502(a) are the only
possible avenues for relief for a participant under ERISA.'" Therefore, if
a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, a participant cannot bring a claim against
the directed trustee based on the directed trustee's personal liability for breach
of fiduciary duty under ERISA, and any state law-based claims would be
preempted." 3
Assuming still that a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, the other possible
relief for injured participants would be to bring a claim against the directed
trustee for aiding a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary. Prior to the

96. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5075, 5079, 5082-83.
97. See discussion supratext accompanying notes 87-89.
98. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464043; S.REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4839-44; see also
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 95, at 609 (major weakness of prior pension
plan legislation prior to ERISA was the absence of a private right of action for plan
participants).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) (policy of ERISA is to protect the interests
of plan participants and provide appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to
federal courts).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
101. See text of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), quoted supra note 44.
102. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48
(1985) (rejecting implied private right of action for extra contractual damages under
ERISA and holding that the carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
ERISA § 502(a) are the only remedies available under ERISA).
103. See authorities cited supranote 13.
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Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,"° the circuit

courts of appeals were divided over whether ERISA section 502(a)(3)
permitted a cause of action against a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty
by a fiduciary." 5 Since the Mertens decision, however, every federal circuit
court of appeals addressing the issue has held that ERISA section 502 does not
authorize a private cause of action by a plan participant against a nonfiduciary." Thus, an interpretation that a directed trustee is not a fiduciary
would bar any monetary recovery by the plan or plan participants against the
directed trustee for breach of his responsibilities under ERISA.' 7 Such an
outcome would be directly contrary to ERISA's stated goal of providing

104. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). In Mertens, the Supreme Court did not specifically
address the issue of whether a cause of action existed under ERISA § 502(a)(3) against
a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty by a fiduciary. The question upon which
certiorari was granted was whether legal damages were available as a remedy under
ERISA § 502(a)(3). The Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a non-fiduciary could

be sued for knowingly participating in a breach of duty by a fiduciary under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3), and held that any remedy available for such a claim must be limited to
traditional equitable relief, not legal damages. Dicta in the Mertens opinion indicated
that the Supreme Court did not believe that ERISA permitted any type of claim against
a non-fiduciary. See id. at 253-54. The Supreme Court has subsequently cited
Mertens in a non-ERISA case as rejecting non-fiduciary liability. See Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1994).
105. Prior to Mertens the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits appeared to recognize a private cause of action under ERISA § 502(a)(3)
against a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty by a fiduciary. See Pappas v. Buck
Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting cause of action for
failure to plead necessary elements); Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1303
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Klepak v. Dole, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Brock v.
Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management,
Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987); Fink v. National Sav. and Trust Co., 772
F.2d 951, 955, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had rejected
a private cause of action under ERISA against a non-fiduciary. See Nieto v. Ecker,
845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988); Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1582 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied,508 U.S. 959 (1993).
106. See Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1995); Reich v. Rowe,
20 F.3d 25, 29-35 (1st Cir. 1994); Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757-58
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1104 (1995).
107. A participant still arguably could bring a suit to enjoin any "act or practice"
by a non-fiduciary directed trustee which violated the terms of the plan or ERISA. See
ERISA § 502(a)(3), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994); Useden,
947 F.2d at 1581. A nonfiduciary directed trustee would not be personally liable,
however, for restoring any losses to the plan or ill-gotten profits resulting from a
breach of duty. See ERISA § 409(a), quoted supra note 42; Useden, 947 F.2d at
1581-82 (liability under ERISA § 409(a) limited to fiduciaries).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/2

26

1996]

Medill: Medill: Law of Directed Trustees under ERISA:
DIRECTED TRUSTEES UNDER ERISA

appropriate remedies and access to the federal courts for injured plan
participants.' 8
B. The Directed Trustee's Duty of
Independent Inquiry Under ERISA
ERISA was designed to incorporate the principles of fiduciary conduct
developed under the common law of trusts, but with modifications appropriate
for employee benefit plans."°9 The appropriate starting point for an analysis
of the duties of a directed trustee is ERISA section 403(a)(1), which states:
[If] the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject to the
direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, .. . [then] the trustees

shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in
accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this
Act." 0
The above-quoted statutory language is capable of two competing
interpretations regarding the scope of the directed trustee's duty to determine
if the direction is in accordance with the terms of the plan and is not contrary
to ERISA. One possible interpretation is that the direction is "proper" and
thus the directed trustee must follow the direction if the direction on its face
is in accordance with the terms of the plan and is not contrary to ERISA.
Another possible interpretation is that in addition to determining that the
direction on its face is consistent with the terms of the plan and is not contrary
to ERISA, the directed trustee has a duty of reasonable care (hereinafter
referred to as the trustee's "duty of independent inquiry") to independently
inquire and determine that the direction is a "proper" one for the directing
fiduciary to make pursuant to the directing fiduciary's duties under ERISA.
Under this interpretation, the directed trustee would be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA for following a facially valid direction if he
"should have known" that the directing fiduciary violated his duties as a
fiduciary under ERISA in issuing the direction.
The significance of whether a directed trustee has a duty of independent
inquiry with respect to a direction given by another plan fiduciary is
highlighted by the following example. Assume ABC Company sponsors a
pension plan for its employees (the "Plan"). The assets of the Plan are held
in trust by Trust Company. Under the terms of the Plan, Trust Company is
a directed trustee subject to the directions of the Plan's Administrative

108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
109. See supra note 33.
110. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994).
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Committee. The Administrative Committee is the named fiduciary under the
Plan and has investment authority with respect to the Plan's assets. The assets
of the Plan have always been invested in Fortune 500 equity securities, which
have averaged a fifteen percent annual rate of return over the years. Trust
Company receives a direction from the Administrative Committee to sell
twenty-five percent of the Plan's equity security holdings and invest the
proceeds in stock of High-Tech, Inc., a start-up computer software company.
Trust Company determines that the direction on its face is in accordance
with the terms of the Plan. Although Trust Company may disagree with the
Administrative Committee's change in investment strategy, it nevertheless
determines that the direction on its face is not contrary to the Administrative
Committee's duties of prudence and prudent diversification under ERISA
section 404(a)(1). If Trust Company does not have a duty of independent
inquiry, it must follow the Administrative Committee's investment direction,
and Trust Company will not be liable for any resulting investment losses to
the Plan. If, however, Trust Company has a duty of independent inquiry, it
must independently determine that the investment does not violate the
Administrative Committee's duties of fiduciary loyalty, prudence and prudent
diversification of plan assets under ERISA section 404(a)(1), and ERISA's
other provisions, most notably the prohibited transaction rules,"' before
Trust Company can follow the direction. Furthermore, under ERISA
section 409(a), Trust Company will be liable if its breach of this duty of
independent inquiry results in a loss to the Plan caused by the purchase of the
High-Tech, Inc. stock.
Under the common law of trusts, a directed trustee was not subject to a
duty of independent inquiry if the direction was made by a trust beneficiary
solely for his own account." 2 Therefore, the FirsTierBank court reasoned
by analogy that the directed trustee was relieved from his common law duty
of independent inquiry when the direction was made by a plan participant.
Again, an example highlights the significance of the role of the directed
trustee's duty of independent inquiry when the direction is made by a plan
participant instead of by another plan fiduciary.
Assume XYZ Company sponsors an ESOP for its employees (the
"ESOP"), the assets of which consist entirely of XYZ Company stock. Under
the terms of the ESOP, each participant is entitled to vote the shares of XYZ
Company stock allocated to that participant's account for the election of XYZ
Company directors. These allocated shares held by the ESOP represent the
controlling votes in the election of directors. XYZ Company becomes the
subject of a proxy battle between a slate of incumbent management directors

111. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1994).
112. See discussion supra text accompanying note 76 and discussion infra Part
III.B.1.
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and a slate of outside directors. The fiduciary for the ESOP, the
Administrative Committee (whose members are associated with the incumbent
management slate of directors), provides the proxy materials prepared by the
incumbent management slate of directors to the ESOP participants. Trust
Company, the directed trustee of the ESOP, learns that, in the proxy materials
prepared by the incumbent management slate, one of the reasons given for
voting for the slate of incumbent management directors is that the business
plan proposed by the outside directors calls for wide-spread layoffs. The
outside directors protest that this proxy information provided to the ESOP
participants is false and misleading.
Trust Company receives voting instructions from the ESOP participants
which are unanimously in favor of the incumbent management slate of
directors. If Trust Company does not have a duty of independent inquiry, it
must follow the voting instructions of the ESOP participants in favor of the
incumbent management slate of directors. If, however, Trust Company has
a duty of independent inquiry, it must attempt to ascertain whether the proxy
materials provided to the ESOP participants were false or misleading.
The above examples illustrate the significant increase in the level of
responsibility of the directed trustee if ERISA imposes a duty of independent
inquiry upon the directed trustee. Such a substantial increase in the directed
trustee's duties under ERISA and the accompanying liability for breach of
those duties should not be imposed without careful consideration of ERISA's
statutory language, its legislative history, and its underlying purposes.
1. Origins Of The Directed Trustee's Duty Of Independent Inquiry
Under The Common Law Of Trusts
Under the common law of trusts, where there were one or more cotrustees, each trustee had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee
from committing a breach of duty."' If a trustee had reason to suspect that
a co-trustee was committing or attempting to commit a breach of duty, failure
by the trustee to take reasonable steps to prevent the breach of duty by the cotrustee would render the trustee liable for the co-trustee's breach of duty."'
The directed trustee's duty of reasonable independent inquiry under the
common law of trusts originates from this duty of reasonable care among co-

113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 184 (1959); 2A AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 184, at 561 (4th
ed. 1987).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224(2)(d) (1959); 3 SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 224.3 at 411.
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trustees to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust."' Where
the person directing the trustee was a fiduciary, under the common law of
trusts the directed trustee was not entitled to rely blindly on the direction.
Rather, the directed trustee was liable for following the direction if he knew
or should have known that the directing fiduciary was violating his duties in
issuing the direction. Thus, under the common law of trusts, a directed trustee
had a duty to reasonably inquire and independently investigate to determine
whether the directing fiduciary was violating his duties to the trust
beneficiaries in making the direction." 6
The directed trustee was not subject to a duty of reasonable independent
inquiry under the common law of trusts when the person giving the direction
was a beneficiary of the trust acting only on his own behalf. In such a
situation, the directed trustee's only duty was to ascertain whether the
direction was in accordance with the terms of the trust and, if so, to follow the
direction." 7
2. Legislative History Regarding The Directed
Trustee's Duty Of Independent Inquiry
Shortly after Congress enacted ERISA, trust law practitioners debated
whether the directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common
law of trusts had been incorporated into ERISA." 8 These discussions,
which predated any judicial decisions on the issue, generally discounted
relevant portions of ERISA's legislative history in arguing that the directed
trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common law of trusts survived
under ERISA.' 1 9
The legislative history of ERISA describing the obligations of a directed
trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1) appears to reject the common law duty

115. See2A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supranote 113, § 185 at 574 (directed trustee
is under a duty similar to duty owed to co-trustees); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 184 (1959) (describing co-trustee duty of reasonable care) and § 185 cmt.
e (directed trustee has duty similar to co-trustee's duty of reasonable care).
116. See DirectedTrusts, supra note 10, at 537; Responsibilityof Trustee Where

Investment Power Is Shared Or ExercisedBy Others, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
517, 521 (1974); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 185, at 574-75;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmts. d & e (1959).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. d (1959); 2A SCOTT
& FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 185 at 574.
118. See DirectedTrusts, supra note 10, at 546-550; Allen H. Merrill, Liability

for Breaches by Co-Fiduciaries,31 Bus. LAW. 115, 120 (1975).
119. See DirectedTrusts, supra note 10, at 546-47; Merrill, supra note 118, at
119-20.
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of independent inquiry when the direction to the trustee is given by another
plan fiduciary. The Conference Report states:
If the plan provides that the trustees are subject to the direction of named
fiduciaries, then the trustees are not to have exclusive management and
control over the plan assets, but generallyare to follow the directions ofthe

namedfiduciary. Therefore, if the plan sponsor wants an investment
committee to direct plan investments, he may provide for such an
arrangement in the plan. In addition, since investment decisions are basic
to plan operations, members of such an investment committee are to be
named fiduciaries ... If the plan so provides, the trustee who is directed
by an investment committee isto follow that committee's directions unless
it is clear on theirface that the actions to be taken under those directions
would be prohibited by the fiduciary responsibility rules of the bill or would
be contrary to the terms of the plan or trust.'
The legislative history also appears to expressly absolve the directed
trustee from liability for following a facially valid direction made by another
plan fiduciary.'
The legislative history does not, however, address the
duties of the directed trustee when the direction is made by a plan participant
instead of by a non-participant plan fiduciary.
3. Agency Interpretation Of The Duty Of Independent Inquiry

When Direction Is Made By A Plan Participant
The Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration ("PWBA"), the
administrative division under the United States Department of Labor charged
with enforcement of ERISA, has taken the position that under some
circumstances a directed trustee has a limited duty of independent inquiry
under ERISA section 403(a)(1) with respect to a direction made by a plan
participant. The PWBA most recently reiterated this position in a published
information letter dated September 28, 1995 ("AFL-CIO Letter"). 2 In the
AFL-CIO Letter, the agency expressed its views on the meaning of a "proper"
direction under ERISA section 403(a)(1) in the context of a directed trustee
of an ESOP with participant-directed, pass-through voting for those shares

120. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5079 (emphasis added).
121. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5082-83 ("[I]f the trustee properly follows the instructions of the named
fiduciaries, the trustee generally is not to be liable for losses which arise out of
following these instructions.").
122. AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28.
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allocated to the accounts of the ESOP participants.'" The AFL-CIO Letter
stated that:
[l]t is the Department's position that a trustee can assure itself that the
instructions it receives from the participants under such a pass-through
voting provision with respect to allocated shares are proper and not contrary
to ERISA if (1) it follows procedures to assure that the eligible individual
account plan's provisions are fairly implemented, that the participants have
not been subjected to coercion or undue pressure in making their decisions,
that necessary information is provided to the participants, that clearly false
information or misleading information is not distributed to the participants
or that any false or misleading information that may have been distributed
by other parties is corrected), and (2) it determines that following the
participant instructions would not violate ERISA.'"
The AFL-CIO Letter indicates that the PWBA views a "proper" direction
in the context of participant-directed voting of employer stock as creating a
duty of independent inquiry for the directed trustee under ERISA section
403(a)(1). The requirements described by the PWBA clearly require the
directed trustee to go beyond the face of the direction and independently
investigate the voting procedures and the conduct of other plan fiduciaries,
particularly those fiduciaries who are associated with the employer. It is
noteworthy that the PWBA's interpretation of the duty of a directed trustee
goes beyond the requirements for a directed trustee under the common law of
trusts. Recall that under the common law of trusts, the directed trustee was
not required to independently investigate a facially valid direction made by a
trust beneficiary solely for his own behalf.'25 In the context of an ESOP
with participant-directedvoting, each participant directs the trustee solely with
respect to the shares held in his own ESOP account, a situation similar to
where a trust beneficiary directs the trustee solely for his own benefit.
Therefore, under a strict application of the common law of trusts, the directed
trustee of the ESOP would not be required to look behind the facially valid
voting directions of the ESOP participants to determine the fairness of the
voting procedures. The PWBA's position resurrects the common law duty of
independent inquiry for directed trustees, but goes further than the common

123. Where the directions to the trustee are given by the plan participants, in
order for ERISA § 403(a)(i) to apply the plan document must designate the plan
participants as the named fiduciaries, see Reich v. NationsBank of Georgia, Civ.A.
1:92-CV-1474-HTW, 1995 WL 316550, at *3 (N.D. Ga. March 29, 1995);
International Games Letter, supra note 28; Polaroid Letter, supra note 28.
124. AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28, at 2250.
125. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 113,
§ 185 at 574; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. d (1959).
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law in its efforts to safeguard the plan participants from unfairness in the
or the potentially
voting procedures, inadequate or inaccurate information,
12 6
coercive influence of the employer sponsoring the plan.
The position of the PWBA with respect to the directed trustee's duty of
independent inquiry differs in the context of a participant-directed plan loan,
which was the situation at issue in FirsTierBank. Absent actual knowledge
that the employer has somehow coerced the participant into borrowing from
his account, if the participant's request for a loan complies on its face with the
terms of the plan and is not contrary to the rules governing plan loans under
ERISA, the directed trustee may rely on the participant's direction. 27
Another common situation where participant directions are made to the
directed trustee involves retirement plans which permit the participants to
direct the investment of the assets held in the participant's individual plan
account pursuant to section 404(c) of ERISA 28 and its implementing

regulations. 29 In the "404(c) plan" context, the PWBA's implementing
regulations focus on whether the participant's exercise of "control" over the
investment of his plan assets is truly "independent," Le., not subject to
improper influence by a plan fiduciary. 3 The regulation itself does not,
however, expressly place a burden of inquiry on the fiduciary to determine
such independent control.' 3 ' For transactions involving employee securities,
as an additional precaution, an independent fiduciary who is not affiliated with
the employer sponsoring the plan must be appointed to act as plan fiduciary
when there is a potential for undue employer influence in the direct or indirect

126. See DOL Letter re: Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc., 11 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 633 (April 30, 1984) [hereinafter "CHH
Letter"]; Polaroid Letter, supra note 28; International Games Letter, supra note 28.
127. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-l(a)(4), Example (3) (1995).
128. ERISA § 404(c) (1994) provides:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his
account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in
his account (as determined under regulations of the Secretary)(1) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a
fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and
(2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this
part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from
such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994).
129. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(a)-(f) (1995).
130. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2)(i) (1995) (defining independentcontrol);
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(E)(4) (defining special procedures for employer
securities).
131. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2) (1995).
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exercise of shareholder rights by plan participants.'
Thus, assuming the
substantial requirements of the regulations are satisfied, the PWBA's position
appears to be that the directed trustee is entitled to rely on the participant's
33
investment direction and is not subject to a duty of independent inquiry.1
An unresolved issue in the section 404(c) area is whether the directed trustee
is subject to a duty of independent inquiry with respect to the participant's
direction when some, but not all, of the requirements set forth in the
regulations pursuant to ERISA section 404(c) have been satisfied.
4. ERISA Section 405(b) Rejects A Duty Of Independent Inquiry
When The Direction Is Made By Another Plan Fiduciary
ERISA section 405(b), a section discussed in Part I of this article as
directly relevant to directed trustee issues, nevertheless provides some
indication that the directed trustee's common law duty of independent inquiry
was not incorporated into ERISA when the direction to the trustee is made by
another plan fiduciary. Section 405(b) provides that "if the assets of the plan
are held by two or more trustees, each shall use reasonable care to prevent a
co-trustee from committing a breach." This subsection appears to incorporate
the duty of reasonable care for co-trustees developed under the common law
of trusts. 34

ERISA section 405(b), however, clearly excludes directed

trustees from this duty of reasonable care. First, the introductory language of
ERISA section 405(b) indicates that this section is to apply "except as
provided in Section 403(a)(1)," the section defining the duties of directed
trustees. Second, ERISA section 405(b)(3)(B) reemphasizes that "[n]o trustee
shall be liable under this subsection for following instructions referred to in
Section 403(a)(1)." Finally, ERISA section 405(b)'s duty of reasonable care
only applies if the directing fiduciary is a "trustee." By definition, however,
under ERISA section 403(a)(1), the directing fiduciary cannot be a

132. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)2(ii)(E)(4)(ix) (1995).
133. Accord, Ronald S. Rizzo & James F. Carey, Reich v. NationsBank of
Georgia, N.A., 4 ERISA Lit. Rep. No. 4, 14, 18 (1995).
134. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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trustee.'35 Therefore, the duty of reasonable care under the common law of
is, by definition under section
trusts incorporated into ERISA section 405(b)
13 6
403(a)(1), inapplicable to a directed trustee.
The exclusion of directed trustees from liability under ERISA section
405(b) indicates that an ERISA directed trustee is not subject to a duty of
independent inquiry when the direction is made by another plan fiduciary.
Under the common law of trusts, the directed trustee's duty of independent
inquiry with respect to a direction given by another fiduciary originated from
and was based upon the duty of reasonable care of a co-trustee. The essence
of the directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common law
of trusts was to verify that the directing fiduciary had acted consistently with
his duties to the trust beneficiaries in issuing the direction. The exclusion of
directed trustees from liability under ERISA section 405(b)'s duty of
reasonable care indicates that the common law duty of independent inquiry for
directed trustees should not be read into ERISA.
In drafting ERISA, Congress used as a foundation the common law of
trusts, but made certain modifications.' 37 The duty of independent inquiry
for directed trustees, a derivation of the general duty of reasonable care among
co-trustees, was well-established under the common law of trusts at the time
ERISA was created. 3 Consequently, the exclusion of directed trustees
from liability under ERISA section 405(b) is strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to impose the common law of trusts duty of independent
inquiry upon a directed trustee when the direction is made by another plan
fiduciary.139

135. ERISA § 403(a)(1) states that a trustee is "subject to the direction of a
named fiduciary who is not a trustee...."(emphasis added) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994)).
136. ERISA § 405(b)(2) makes clear that a directed trustee is still liable under
ERISA § 405(a) if the directed trustee has actual knowledge that the direction is a
breach of fiduciary duty by the directing fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(B)
(1994).
137. See supra note 33.
138. See discussion and authorities cited supra Part III.B.1.
139. Cf Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 253-54 (ERISA section
502(a)'s limitation of civil actions to fiduciaries in light of well-established liability of
nonfiduciary under common law of trusts is strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize remedy against nonfiduciary).
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5. Imposing a Duty of Independent Inquiry Upon the
Directed Trustee Creates an Unnecessary Distinction
in the Duties of the Directed Trustee
Viewing ERISA section 405(b) as rejecting a duty of independent inquiry
for directed trustees when the direction is made by a non-participant plan
fiduciary is consistent with ERISA's allocation of fiduciary responsibilities and
liabilities, particularly when the directed trustee is subject to the investment
directions of a duly appointed "investment manager." Under ERISA section
402(c)(3), 141 the named fiduciary of the plan may appoint an investment
manager to manage the assets of the plan. This allows the named fiduciary
to delegate to the investment manager the named fiduciary's responsibility
under ERISA section 402(a)(1)14 1 to manage the assets of the plan. If the
named fiduciary appoints an investment manager, the liability of the directed
trustee for following the investment directions of the investment manager is
determined under ERISA section 405(d). 142 ERISA section 405(d)(1)
provides:
If an investment manager or managers have been appointed under section
402(c)(3), then, notwithstanding subsections (a) (2) and (3) and subsection
(b), no trustee shall be liablefor the acts or omissions of such investment
manager or managers, or be under an obligation to invest or otherwise
manage any asset of the plan which is subject to the management of such
investment manager.' 43
Thus under ERISA section 405(d)(1) the trustee does not have a duty of
independent inquiry with respect to the directions of the investment manager.
Reading ERISA section 405(b) as rejecting the common law duty of
independent inquiry for the directed trustee places the directed trustee in a
similar position regardless of whether the party providing the investment
direction is the named fiduciary or the named fiduciary's duly appointed
investment manager. A contrary interpretation creates an unnecessary
distinction in the duties of the directed trustee, depending upon whether the
party giving the direction is the named fiduciary or the named fiduciary's
investment manager.' 4

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (1994).
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d) (1994).
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
Accord Merrill, supra note 118, at 120.
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This unnecessary distinction can be illustrated by example: Recall the
earlier example of ABC Company, which sponsors a pension plan for its
employees and has Trust Company as the directed trustee. In that example,
Trust Company was subject to the investment directions of the named plan
fiduciary, the Administrative Committee. Trust Company's dilemma in the
example was that if Trust Company was subject to the common law duty of
independent inquiry, it must independently determine that the direction to
invest twenty-five percent of the Plan's assets in High-Tech, Inc. stock was
not contrary to the Administrative Committee's fiduciary duties or ERISA's
other requirements. If Trust Company failed to take reasonable measures to
determine that the Administrative Committee's investment direction was not
contrary to its fiduciary duties, Trust Company would be liable for following
the facially valid investment direction if the Administrative Committee had
committed a breach of duty in issuing the investment direction and a loss to
the Plan resulted from the purchase of the High-Tech, Inc. stock.
Assume that instead of the Administrative Committee directing the Plan
investments itself, the Administrative Committee appoints Securities Brokers,
Inc. as an investment manager, pursuant to ERISA section 402(c)(3), to
manage the investment of the Plan's assets. Securities Brokers, Inc. issues the
exact same investment direction to Trust Company. What is the duty of Trust
Company with respect to the direction? Under ERISA section 405(d)(1),
Trust Company has no duty of independent inquiry with respect to the
direction and is not liable if the purchase of the High-Tech, Inc. stock results
in a loss to the Plan, irrespective of whether Securities Brokers, Inc. had acted
contrary to ERISA in issuing the direction.
As the above example illustrates, if the reference to a "proper" direction
in ERISA section 403(a)(1) is read as creating a duty of independent inquiry
for the directed trustee when acting at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary, the directed trustee would act at his peril if he relied on a facially
valid investment direction issued by the named plan fiduciary. If, however,
the investment direction was made by an investment manager appointed to
manage the plan's assets on behalf of the named plan fiduciary, under ERISA
section 405(d)(1) the directed trustee would be absolved from liability if he
followed the exact same facially valid investment direction made by an
investment manager appointed by the named plan fiduciary.
The interpretation of ERISA section 403(a)(1) as not incorporating the
common law duty of independent inquiry with respect to a direction made by
a non-participant plan fiduciary avoids this unnecessary distinction in the
duties of the directed trustee. A parallel liability structure for a directed
trustee, regardless of whether the direction is from a named fiduciary or from
the named fiduciary's appointed investment manager, is consistent with the
report of the House and Senate Conference Committee ("Conference Report")
comparing the liability of the directed trustee when acting at the direction of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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the named plan fiduciary versus an investment manager. The Conference
Report states:
If the plan provides that the trustees are subject to the direction of named
fiduciaries, then the trustees are not to have the exclusive management and
control over the plan assets, but generally are to follow the directions of the
named fiduciary. Therefore, if the plan sponsor wants an investment
committee to direct plan investments, he may provide for such an
arrangement in the plan. In addition, since investment decisions are basic
to plan operations, members of such an investment committee are to be
named fiduciaries ... If the plan so provides, the trustee who is directed
by an investment committee is to follow that committee's directions unless
it is clear on theirface that the actions to be taken under those directions
would be prohibitedby the fiduciaryresponsibilityrules ofthe bill or would
be contrary to the terms of the plan or trust.
In addition . . ., to the extent that the management of plan assets is
delegated to a special category of persons called "investment managers",
the trustee is not to have exclusive discretion to manage and control the
plan assets,
nor would the trustee be liablefor any act of such investment
145
manager.
A contrary argument may be made that the clear exculpatory language of
ERISA section 405(d)(1) absolving the directed trustee from liability where
the direction is from an investment manager is evidence that Congress knew
how to protect a directed trustee from liability for following directions, but
chose to limit this protection to the investment manager context. 146 Thus,
section 405(d)(1) could be read as an indication that the directed trustee has
a duty of independent inquiry under ERISA with respect to the directions of
another plan fiduciary except in the investment manager context.
There are two countervailing reasons why ERISA section 405(d)(1)
should not be read as evidence that the directed trustee is subject to a duty of
independent inquiry except when the direction is made by an investment
manager. First, as a practical matter such an analysis sets up the possibility
that two fiduciaries-the directing fiduciary and the directed trustee-must
approve the direction.'47
Such a result is inconsistent with ERISA's4
statutory scheme permitting the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities. 1
Such an interpretation also undermines the statute's careful balancing of

145. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5079 (emphasis added).
146. See Rizzo & Carey, supra note 133, at 19.
147. See Rizzo & Carey, supra note 133, at 19.
148. See discussion and authorities cited infra notes 158, 162-65.
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competing interests to avoid creating rules which are so costly to administer
that employers are discouraged from offering benefit plans to their
employees.'
Quite simply, if directed trustees are required to assume the
full range of fiduciary responsibility and liability associated with the duty of
independent inquiry, they must increase the price of their services accordingly.
A second compelling reason for rejecting the common law duty of
independent inquiry when the directed trustee acts at the direction of a nonparticipant plan fiduciary is the plain language of ERISA section 405(b).
ERISA section 405(b) imposes the common law duty of independent inquiry
upon co-trustees. 50 ERISA section 405(b)(3)(B), however, expressly states
that "[n]o trustee shall be liable under this subsection for following
instructions referred to in ERISA section 403(a)(1)."'' This exclusion of
a directed trustee from liability under ERISA section 405(b) is meaningless if
the directed trustee is nevertheless subject to a duty of independent inquiry
the
under ERISA section 403(a)(1). A contrary interpretation would render
52
superfluous.'
405(b)(3)(B)
section
ERISA
of
language
exculpatory
6. Conclusion
Under the common law of trusts, a directed trustee had a duty of
reasonable care to independently determine that the fiduciary directing the
trustee had not violated his duties to the trust beneficiaries in issuing the
direction. Although an argument could be made that the reference to a
"proper" direction in ERISA section 403(a)(1) incorporates the common law
duty of independent inquiry for directed trustees, the legislative history of
ERISA indicates that when the person directing the trustee is a non-participant
plan fiduciary, the directed trustee is entitled to rely on a facially valid
direction. The rejection of a duty of independent inquiry for a direction made
by a non-participant plan fiduciary is consistent with ERISA section 405(b),
which excludes directed trustees from liability for breach of duty of reasonable
care to prevent a breach of duty by a co-fiduciary. This express exclusion of
a directed trustee from a co-trustee's duty of reasonable care is significant
because the directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common
law was based upon the co-trustee's duty of reasonable care. The conclusion
that ERISA section 403(a)(1) does not impose a duty of independent inquiry
upon the directed trustee when the direction is made by a non-participant plan
fiduciary also avoids creating an unnecessary distinction in the duties of the

149.
150.
151.
152.

See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(3)(B) (1994).
See discussion and authorities cited infra note 160.
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directed trustee depending upon whether the direction is made by the named
plan fiduciary or his duly appointed investment manager.
The statutory analysis of the meaning of a "proper" direction under
ERISA section 403(a)(1) becomes much less clear when the direction is made
by a plan participant solely for his own account. Under the common law of
trusts, if the person directing the trustee was a trust beneficiary acting solely
on his own behalf and not in a fiduciary capacity, the directed trustee did not
have a duty of independent inquiry and could rely on the direction if it was
in accordance with the terms of the trust. ERISA's standards and procedural
protections, however, are a reflection that the common law of trusts did not
always offer sufficient protection to plan participants." 3 A strict application
of this common law rule in all situations pursuant to the reasoning of the
FirsTier Bank decision would leave plan participants vulnerable to unfair
voting procedures and the exercise of undue influence by their employer,
particularly in the context of participant directions involving employer
stock.'54 In other situations, such as participant-directed plan loans' or
participant-directed investments,'56 the elaborate procedures governing the
participant's directions under ERISA arguably provide sufficient protection to
the participants so that imposing a duty of independent inquiry upon the
directed trustee is unnecessary. Such a determination necessarily will involve
a case-by-case analysis balancing ERISA's competing interests between
protecting plan participants and not creating a system that is so costly to
administer that employers are discouraged from offering benefit plans to their
employees.'5 7
In summary, situations where the direction to the trustee is made by a
plan participant must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind
ERISA's underlying purposes and the safeguards created through the statute
and its implementing regulations. The analytical approach adopted in the
FirsTierBank court decision, a literal incorporation of the common law of
trusts rules into the context of ERISA, is inappropriate because in some
situations more protection is needed for the plan participants than was afforded
by the common law of trusts. When the direction to the trustee is made by
a non-participant plan fiduciary, however, ERISA appears to reject the
common law duty of independent inquiry for directed trustees.

153. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
154. See AFL-CIO Letter, supranote 28; CHH Letter, supranote 126; Polaroid
Letter, supra note 28; International Games Letter, supra note 28.
155. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-1 (1995) (regulations governing plan loans to
participants).
156. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1995) (regulations governing participant
directed investment of plan assets held in their accounts).
157. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL OF THE LAW OF DIRECTED TRUSTEES

A. The Need For A Model
The conclusion that ERISA rejects the common law duty of independent
inquiry when the directed trustee acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary does not answer the fundamental questions of: (1) what are the
fiduciary duties of a directed trustee under ERISA; and (2) how do the
fiduciary duties of a directed trustee differ from the duties of the directing
fiduciary? The model discussed below attempts to address these fundamental
questions by setting forth a theory reconciling the three key statutory
provisions under ERISA goveming directed trustees and directing fiduciaries.
These sections are ERISA sections 403(a)(1), 404(a)(1), and 405(a).
B. Overview Of The Model
There are two basic concepts underlying the model. The first concept is
that ERISA's statutory scheme authorizes the allocation and delegation of
responsibilities among fiduciaries."5 8 The model is designed to be consistent
with the statutory framework permitting the allocation and allegation of such
fiduciary responsibilities. The second concept underlying the model is the
well-established rule of statutory interpretation that specific statutory
provisions control over more general ones." 9 The model balances this rule
of statutory interpretation against other rules of statutory construction that an

158.

See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5038, 5080-83; 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13-14.16 (1995). ERISA's rules governing
the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities are scattered throughout the statute. See 29
U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2) (1994) (plan shall describe any procedures for the allocation of
responsibilities for its operation and administration); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(2)-(3) (1994)
(named plan fiduciary may designate persons to render advice with respect to
fiduciary's responsibilities or appoint investment manager to manage plan assets); 29
U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(B) (1994) (co-trustees may allocate specific duties by agreement
authorized in trust instrument); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1) (1994) (plan instrument may
provide for procedures allocating fiduciary responsibilities among named fiduciaries
and permitting named fiduciaries to designate other persons to carry out non-trustee
fiduciary duties under plan).
159. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1996); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, 112 U.S. 2031, 2037 (1992) ("it is a commonplace of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general"); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398,406 (1981); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,489-90 (1973); Heam v. Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing
ERISA); United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1994); Wetlands Water
Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 43 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 1994).
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interpretation which gives effect to the entire statute and does not render part
16
1 or lead to a result contrary to the
of the statutory language superfluous
6
'
preferred.'
is
legislation
intent of the
The model places primary responsibility for compliance with the fiduciary
duties of ERISA section 404(a)(1) on the directing fiduciary, who must be the
"named fiduciary" under the plan. 6 Under ERISA's statutory scheme,
every plan must have at least one named fiduciary. 6 In the hierarchy of
fiduciary responsibilities established by ERISA, the named fiduciary occupies
the position with the highest level of responsibility. The purpose of the
named fiduciary requirement is to focus with a degree of certainty the overall
responsibility for managing and operating the plan and the liability for its
mismanagement." The named fiduciary may delegate his responsibilities
only if such delegation of authority is authorized by
to another fiduciary, but
6
the terms of the plan.

1

In contrast to the directing fiduciary, under the model a directed trustee's
responsibilities are limited to the functions described by the specific language

160. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985)
(construing ERISA); United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877
(1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Pennsylvania Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); Heam v. Western Conference
of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing
ERISA); American Stores Co. v. American Stores Co. Retirement Plan, 928 F.2d 986,
990 (10th Cir. 1991) (construing ERISA); Board of Trustees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495,
504 (3rd Cir. 1992) (construing ERISA); United States v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 212
(8th Cir. 1994).
161. See Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984); Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 71 (1982).
162. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994) (written instrument establishing ERISA plan
shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries).
164. See Birmingham v. Sagen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515,
522 (2d Cir. 1983); Arakeleian v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 400, 404
(D.D.C. 1987); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5077-78, 5081 (purpose of requirement that plan must identify named fiduciary
is so that plan participants will know who is responsible for managing and operating
the plan).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2) (1994) (plan shall describe any procedure for
the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and management of the plan); H.R.

CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 50781
(allocation or delegation of fiduciary responsibilities is allowed only if the plan
provides for it).
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of ERISA section 403(a)(1). The model takes the position that ERISA section
403(a)(1) establishes only two substantive criteria for directed trustees to use
in evaluating whether to follow the instructions of the non-participant directing
fiduciary. These two criteria require the directed trustee to determine if the
direction on its face is, first, in accordance with the terms of the plan, and
second, is not contrary to ERISA. If both of these substantive criteria are
satisfied, the direction is "proper" and the directed trustee may rely on the
direction. The directed trustee has no duty to independently inquire behind
or investigate the propriety of the direction to verify that the direction does
not violate the duties of the non-participant directing fiduciary under ERISA.
The model takes the position that the limited duties specifically pertaining
to a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1) control over the more
general fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a)(1). 66
Consequently, ERISA section 403(a)(1) makes some of the duties described
in section 404(a)(1) inapplicable to directed trustees, and restricts the
application of other ERISA section 404(a)(1) duties, in particular the duty of
prudence described in ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B), to the limited role of the
directed trustee described in ERISA section 403(a)(1).
Under the model, the directed trustee is liable for a breach of duty by the
directing fiduciary in making the direction if the directed trustee has actual
knowledge that the direction is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary.
The directed trustee also is liable if he follows a direction which on its face
fails to satisfy the two substantive criteria of ERISA section 403(a)(1). The
directed trustee has no duty of independent inquiry, however, to detect and
prevent a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary. Consequently, the
directed trustee will not be liable for carrying out a facially valid direction
which in fact is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary, absent actual
knowledge of such breach of duty.
C. The RelationshipBetween ERISA Sections 403(a)(1)
and 404(a) In The Directed Trustee Context
The model takes the position that the duties of a directed trustee are
determined by the specific language of ERISA section 403(a)(1). The general
fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a) apply to a directed trustee
only to the limited extent of carrying out the directions of the directing
fiduciary. In contrast, the complete range of duties described in ERISA
section 404(a) would apply to the directing fiduciary in making the direction.

166. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1996) (rationale for the
canon of statutory construction that "the specific governs the general" is a warning
against applying a general provision when doing so would undermine the limitations
created by a more specific provision).
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Diagram 1 below illustrates the respective duties of the non-participant
directing fiduciary and the directed trustee.

DL4GRAM 1

Fiduciary

Subject to
403(a)(1)

)
(
)

)
(
Rejects

(

Named
Plan

Subject to
404(a)(1)

-

Direction

)

--

Directed
Trustee

(
)
(
)

Direction

)

(

)(

Accepts and
Executes

)

As a threshold matter, the model takes the position that ERISA section
404(a) applies, albeit in a limited fashion, to a directed trustee by virtue of the
trustee's status as a fiduciary. This position is consistent with the introductory
language of ERISA section 404(a)(1), which states: "Subject to Sections
403(c) and (d), 4042, and 4044, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
The introductory language to ERISA section
respect to a plan . .. ,67
404(a)(1) excludes subsections (c) and (d) of ERISA section 403, but does not
exclude subsection 403(a)(1), the directed trustee subsection, thereby
indicating that ERISA section 404(a)(1) does apply to a directed trustee
because of the trustee's status as a fiduciary. This introductory language
limits the application of ERISA section 404(a), however, to the specific duties
carried out by the fiduciary. For a directed trustee, these duties are limited by
section 403(a)(1) to ascertaining whether the direction is in accordance with
the terms of the plan and is not contrary to ERISA. Diagram 2, below,
illustrates how the fiduciary responsibilities described in ERISA section 404(a)
should apply in a limited fashion to directed trustees.

167. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
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DL4GRAM2
Rejects

Direction
to Dirc

Standard = 404(a)(1)(B) - Reasonable Directed Trustee:
Decision Point= On its face, does the direction satisfy 403(a)(1) criteria?

Accepts and
Executes
404(a)(1) = Standards for Method of Execution

(Loyalty, Prudence, Follow Terms of Plan)

The directed trustee is subject to a limited duty of reasonable care under
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) by virtue of the nature of his specific duties under
ERISA section 403(a)(1). This limited duty of reasonable care requires the
directed trustee to decide if the direction on its face satisfies the two criteria
of ERISA section 403(a)(1) and, if so, to carry out the direction with the care
of a reasonabledirectedtrustee under the circumstances. The directed trustee
is required to examine the direction on its face and determine, as a reasonable
directed trustee would, if the direction is in accordance with the terms of the
plan and is not contrary to the directing fiduciary's duties under ERISA
section 404(a)(1) and the other provisions of ERISA. This inquiry pursuant
to ERISA section 403(a)(1) incorporates the directed trustee's duty under
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D) to "override" a direction made in accordancewith
the terms of the plan if following the direction would be contrary to
ERISA." s The directed trustee is not required (or even permitted) to
substitute his judgment for the discretionary judgment of the directing
fiduciary regarding the direction. In fact, under ERISA section 403(a)(1), the
directed trustee is requiredto follow the direction pursuant to the procedures

168. See AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28 (trustee may follow terms of plan only

to the extent permitted by ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D); Polaroid Letter, supranote 28
(same); CHH Letter, supra note 126 (if plan prescribes a course of action that is
inconsistent with ERISA, trustee cannot engage in that action).
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under the plan if the directed trustee reasonably determines that the direction
is in accordance with the terms of the plan and not contrary to ERISA. 169
Applying the objective standard of a reasonable directed trustee pursuant
to ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) provides a measure of protection to the plan
participants against an erroneous decision by the directed trustee to follow a
direction which a reasonable directed trustee would have determined did not
meet the two criteria of ERISA section 403(a)(1). This construction is
consistent with judicial rulings interpreting ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) that
a "pure heart and an empty head" are not enough to satisfy the fiduciary's
duty of reasonable care. 7
The limited duties of the directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1)
render the remaining fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a)(1) only
indirectly applicable to the directed trustee in evaluating the direction given
by the directing fiduciary. These duties, specifically the duty to override the
direction pursuant to section 404(a)(1)(D) if the direction is contrary to
ERISA, apply to the directed trustee only to the extent that the directed trustee
must determine whether, based on the face of the direction, the directing
fiduciary has acted contrary to his ERISA section 404(a)(1) duties in issuing
the direction. Thus, the directed trustee must determine, under an objective
standard of a reasonable directed trustee, whether the direction on its face is
not contrary to the directing fiduciary's duties of loyalty,' prudence,'
and prudent diversification, the prohibited transaction rules, and any
other applicable ERISA requirements.'
The limited application of ERISA section 404(a)(1) in the directed trustee
context can be illustrated by example: recall the prior example of ABC
Company where the Administrative Committee directed Trust Company to
purchase High-Tech, Inc. stock. Assume that Trust Company purchased the
High-Tech, Inc. stock. The Administrative Committee now directs Trust
Company to sell the Plan's holdings of High-Tech, Inc. stock, which have
quadrupled in value. Trust Company must first decide whether the direction
on its face is in accordance with the terms of the Plan and is not contrary to
ERISA. Under the model, this determbination is subject to the standard of a

169. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994) (directed trustee shall be subject to
proper directions of other fiduciary).
170. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers &
Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1994).
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07 (1994).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1994).
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reasonable directed trustee based on ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B). Although
Trust Company may believe that the stock should not be sold because the
stock price potentially could increase even more, Trust Company reasonably
determines that the direction on its face is not contrary to the Administrative
Committee's duties of loyalty, prudence and prudent diversification. The
direction on its face also is not contrary to ERISA's other provisions.
Having decided that the direction on its face satisfies the two criteria of
ERISA section 403(a)(1), Trust Company negligently delays executing the
direction to sell the High Tech, Inc. stock for a month, during which time the
price of the stock declines. Trust Company's failure prudently to carry out the
direction to sell the stock would be a violation of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B),
and Trust Company would be liable to the Plan under ERISA section 409(a)
to restore the gains from the sale of the stock that were lost due to the delay
in executing the direction to sell.
The two points at which the directed trustee is subject to a reasonable
care standard under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B), the review of the direction
for facial validity under ERISA section 403(a)(1) and the execution of a
facially valid direction, give a measure of protection to the plan participants.
Their real protection, however, lies in the directing fiduciary's compliance
with the full spectrum of duties described in ERISA section 404(a). It is the
directing fiduciary's responsibility to issue directions which comply with his
duties under section 404(a)(1) and which are not contrary to ERISA's other
requirements. If the directing fiduciary fails, he is the liable fiduciary under
ERISA's statutory scheme.
Such a result is consistent with ERISA's allocation of fiduciary
responsibilities and liabilities. 76 The Conference Report implicitly sanctions
this allocation of fiduciary liability.
[T]he plan may also provide that the trustee is to be subject to the direction
of named fiduciaries with respect to investment decisions. In this case, if
the trustee properly follows the instructions of the named fiduciaries, the
trustee generally is not to be liable for losses which arise out of following
these instructions. (The namedfiduciaries,however, would be subject to the
usualfiduciary responsibility rules and would be subject to liability on a

breach of these rules)."7

176. See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 158, 162-65.
177. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5082-83.
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D. Analysis Of The Standards Of Liability ForA Discretionary
FiduciaryAnd A Directed Trustee Under ERISA Section 405
The starting point for the model's analysis of the liability of the directed
trustee for a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary is the language of
ERISA section 405(a), which states:
(a) In addition to any liability which he may have under any other provision
of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach
of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan
in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to
conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act
or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1) in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a
breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he
makes 1reasonable
efforts under the circumstances to remedy the
78
breach.
As a prerequisite to co-fiduciary liability, ERISA sections 405(a)(1) and
(3) require the directed trustee to have actual knowledge of the directing
fiduciary's breach of duty. This actual knowledge requirement is consistent
with ERISA section 405(b)'s exclusion of directed trustees from liability for
failure to reasonably prevent a co-fiduciary's breach of duty. ERISA section
405(b)(2), however, expressly states that nothing in section 405(b) limits any
liability a fiduciary may have under section 405(a). 179 Under ERISA section
405(a)(1), if the directed trustee has actual knowledge that a facially valid
direction is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary, the directed trustee
will also be liable if he tarries out the direction, an act of active participation
in the breach. For example, assume that Trust Company receives a facially
valid investment direction from the Administrative Committee to use the
proceeds from the sale of the High-Tech, Inc. stock to purchase 10,000 shares
of Company X. The President of ABC Company, who is one of the two
members of the Administrative Committee, tells Trust Company that he knows
that the Company X stock is a poor investment for the Plan. However, he

178. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(2) (1994).
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personally has purchased 10,000 shares of Company X, and his personal share
ownership, when combined with the shares to be purchased by the ABC
Company Plan, will enable him to control fifty-one percent of Company X's
outstanding stock. Under these circumstances Trust Company potentially will
be liable under ERISA section 409(a) for any investment losses to the Plan if
it carries out the direction because Trust Company has actual knowledge that
at least one of the two members of the Administrative Committee has
breached his duty of loyalty under ERISA section 404(a)(1) in issuing the
direction for the Plan to purchase the Company X stock.
Under ERISA section 405(a)(3), even if the directed trustee does not
actively participate in the directing fiduciary's breach of duty, once the
directed trustee has actual knowledge of the directing fiduciary's breach of
duty, the directed trustee has an affirmative obligation to make "reasonable
efforts" under the circumstancesto remedy the breach. Subsection (3) is most
likely to come into play only in limited circumstances where the directed
trustee somehow learns that the directing fiduciary is engaged in a breach of
duty that does not involve a direction to the directed trustee. In such rare
circumstances, the PWBA has indicated that mere resignation in protest of the
directing fiduciary's conduct will not be sufficient to avoid co-fiduciary
liability under ERISA section 405(a)(3). The directed trustee may be required

to go so far as to seek an injunction against the directing fiduciary or notify
the PWBA of the violation. 80

180. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 FR-10 Q&A (1995). This regulation describes
the steps that the minority group of trustees may be required to take in the event that
the majority group of trustees engages in conduct constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty:
FR-10 Q: An employee benefit plan is considering the construction
of a building to house the administration of the plan. One trustee has
proposed that the building be constructed on a cost plus basis by a
particular contractor without competitive bidding. When the trustee was
questioned by another trustee as to the basis of choice of the contractor, the
impact of the building on the plan's administrative costs, whether a cost
plus contract would yield a better price to the plan than a fixed price basis,
and why a negotiated contract would be better than letting the contract for
competitive bidding, no satisfactory answers were provided. Several of the
trustees have argued that letting such a contract would be a violation of
their general fiduciary responsibilities. Despite their arguments, a majority
of trustees appear to be ready to vote to construct the building as proposed.
What should the minority trustees do to protect themselves from liability
under section 409(a) of the Act and section 405(b)(1) of the Act?
A: Here, where a majority of trustees appear ready to take action
which would clearly be contrary to the prudence requirement of section
404(a)(1)(B) of the Act, it is incumbent on the minority trustees to take all
reasonableand legal steps to prevent the action. Such steps might include
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Once again, the status of the directed trustee as a fiduciary under ERISA
is critical to the integrated operation of ERISA's statutory scheme. As a nonfiduciary, a directed trustee would lack standing to bring a private civil action
under ERISA section 502 to enjoin the directing fiduciary's conduct. As a
fiduciary, a directed trustee could bring a private civil action to enjoin the
directing fiduciary's conduct, a course of conduct clearly contemplated as
possibly required under ERISA by the PWBA.
Subsection (2) of ERISA section 405(a) is the most difficult conceptually
to apply in the context of a directed trustee because it incorporates by
reference the directed trustee's "specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary" under ERISA section 404(a).'
As discussed above,
the "specific responsibilities" of a directed trustee under ERISA section
404(a)(1) are limited by ERISA section 403(a)(1). Therefore, the model takes
the position that a directed trustee can only be liable under subsection (2) of
section 405(a) if the directed trustee acted imprudently in failing to determine
that the direction on its face did not satisfy the two criteria of ERISA section
403(a)(1) under the reasonable directed trustee standard of ERISA section
404(a)(1)(B). Such a failure would result in the directed trustee either
following a direction that was contrary to the terms of the plan, or following
a direction which, although in accordance with the terms of the plan, was

preparationsto obtain an injunctionfrom a FederalDistrict court under
section 502(a)(3) ofthe Act, to notify the Labor Department,or to publicize
the vote ifthe decision is to proceed as proposed If, having taken all
reasonable and legal steps to prevent the imprudent action, the minority

trustees have not succeeded, they will not incur liability for the action of
the majority. Mere resignation, however, without taking steps to prevent
the imprudent action, will not suffice to avoid liability for the minority
trustees once they have knowledge that the imprudent action is under
consideration.
More generally, trustees should take great care to document adequately
all meetings where actions are taken with respect to management and
control of plan assets. Written minutes of all actions taken should be kept
describing the action taken, and stating how each trustee voted on each

matter. If, as in the case above, trustees object to a proposed action on the
grounds of possible violation of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
the Act, the trustees so objecting should insist that their objections and the
responses to such objections be included in the record of the meeting. It
should be noted that, where a trustee believes that a cotrustee has already
committed a breach, resignation by the trustee as a protest against such
breach will not generally be considered sufficient to discharge the trustee's
positive duty under section 405(a)(3) to make reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to remedy the breach.
(emphasis added).

181. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (1994).
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contrary to ERISA. In either situation, the directed trustees' conduct in
following the direction would result in a breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D).
V. CONCLUSION
Directed trustees play an important role in the management and
administration of employee benefit plans under ERISA. A directed trustee's
status as a fiduciary under ERISA ensures that the plan participants will be
able to redress a breach of fiduciary duty by the directed trustee through the
federal courts. The fiduciary duties of a directed trustee, however, are limited
by ERISA section 403(a)(1). The directed trustee's limited fiduciary
responsibility is consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme permitting the
allocation of fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities.
Recent judicial decisions concerning directed trustees depart from the
principle that a directed trustee is a fiduciary under ERISA, but with
statutorily limited fiduciary duties. By incorporating the rules for directed
trustees developed under the common law into ERISA, these decisions
simultaneously overburden the directed trustee when acting at the direction of
a non-participant plan fiduciary while failing to provide adequate protection
to the plan participants when they are the ones providing directions to the
trustee.
This article rejects a literal incorporation of the common law of trusts
into ERISA in the context of directed trustees. The article proposes that
where the directed trustee acts at the direction of the plan participants, the
degree of deference that a directed trustee must afford the direction will vary
depending upon the context and the particular safeguards built into ERISA and
its implementing regulations for situations involving participant directions.
When the directed trustee acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary, principles of general application governing the duties of the directed
trustee can be derived from ERISA's statutory provisions in a manner that is
consistent with the statute's legislative history and remedial purposes.
Part IV of this article proposes an analytical model of the duties under
ERISA of a directed trustee who acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary. The model addresses a theoretical void in the law and the scholarly
literature by reconciling the three key statutory sections of ERISA which
govern the duties of directed trustees and directing fiduciaries. The design of
the model is consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme allocating and
delegating responsibilities among fiduciaries while harmonizing ERISA's
various statutory provisions governing directed trustees.
Directed trustees of employee benefit plans subject to ERISA are
responsible for the custody of plan assets worth billions of dollars. ERISA
was enacted in part because the law developed under the common law of
trusts was deemed inadequate in the areas of fiduciary responsibility for
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employee benefit plan assets and remedies for injured plan participants.
ERISA's statutory scheme reflects a careful balancing of fiduciary
responsibilities and protections for plan participants designed for the unique
context of employee benefit plans. Recent federal court decisions have
undermined this statutory scheme by incorporating into ERISA principles
developed under the common law of trusts in order to determine the fiduciary
status and duties of directed trustees. Federal courts faced with directed
trustee issues in the future should reconsider the reasoning of the FirsTier
Bank and Maniace decisions in light of ERISA's statutory language and
remedial purposes. This article provides a blueprint for such reconsideration.
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